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The Perfect in Context: A Corpus Study
Atsuko Nishiyama and Jean-Pierre Koenig*

1 Introduction
Several recent studies of the English present perfect have argued that its interpretation requires addressees to draw pragmatic inferences (Portner 2003,
Borillo et al. 2004, Nishiyama and Koenig 2004). Portner (2003) and Borillo
et al. (2004) argue that the perfect presupposes or elaborates a topic, whose
identity must be inferred; Nishiyama and Koenig (2004) suggest that the perfect introduces into the discourse free variables whose values must also be
inferred and constitute implicitures in the sense of Bach (1994). However neither proposal specifies the rules speakers may or must use to draw the relevant
pragmatic inferences or whether such inferences are plausibly drawn by addressees. This paper purports to fill this gap through the study of over 600
English perfect examples from a diverse range of genres (newspapers, discussions, conversations, and narrative texts). The results of our study show (i) that
the required inferences belong to one of only a few inference patterns and are
easy enough to be plausibly drawn; (ii) that Borillo eta/. 's (2004) and Portner's (2003) topic-driven analysis of the perfect cannot account for all uses of
the English present perfect.

2 Two Recent Inferential Theories of the Present Perfect
Discourse topics and the perfect. Portner (2003) proposes that part of the
meaning of the perfect consists in a presupposition that sentences that include
a verb in the perfect are answers to the discourse topic, which he regards as
an implicit question. For example, sentence (I) presupposes the availability
to speech participants of a question such as (2a) and can be used in a context
such as (2b ).

(1)
(2)

Mary has read Middlemarch.
a. We need to get an explanation of George Eliot's style; who can we
ask?

*We would like to thank Jiirgen Bohnemeyer, Paula Chesley, Roelant Ossewaarde,
Christopher Phipps, and the audience of the 29th Penn Linguistics Colloquium for comments on the content of this paper.
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b. Well, George Eliot wrote Middlemarch, and if someone reads an

author's books, they understand her style. Unless they're stupid of
course. Mary is smart, and she has read Middlemarch ...
Borillo eta!. (2004) propose, within Segmented Discourse Representation
Theory (SDRT), that the perfect creates an Elaboration structure in which the
utterance situation or writing context provides a topic which sentences containing a perfect elaborate on.

Inferred perfect state view. Nishiyama and Koenig (2004) modify and extend the standard analysis of the perfect within Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) outlined in Kamp and Reyle (1993), van Eijck and Kamp (1997)
and de Swart (1998) and propose the following meaning for the perfect:
(3)

The perfect introduces into a Discourse Representation Structure:
i. an eventuality ev, whose temporal trace precedes reference timer
(speech time n for present perfects) (7(ev) -< r), and
1i. a state s (hereafter, the perfect state), whose temporal trace overlaps reference timer (7(s) or) and whose category is inferable
from the occurrence of ev.

ev,s,n
¢(ev)
7(ev)-< n

X(s)
7(s) on

Figure 1: DRS for the meaning of the present perfect

Figure 1 represents the simplified DRS that results from the interpretation of
a sentence whose verb and arguments contribute the eventuality description ¢
(hereafter, the base eventuality description). The first line lists the discourse
referents introduced by the present perfect. ev is an eventuality of any type,
which the second line, i.e., the first discourse condition, requires to satisfy
the base eventuality description ¢. 7 is a function that maps an eventuality
onto its temporal trace. 7( ev) -< n on the third line says that the temporal
trace of ev precedes speech time n (-<=temporal precedence), since reference
time r equals speech time n in the present perfect. The fourth line, 7( s) o n,
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says that the temporal trace of the perfect state s overlaps speech time n ( o
=temporal overlap). Nishiyama and Koenig's main innovation is the claim
that the category of the perfect state s is semantically a free variable (X in
Figure 1), which must be filled in by the addressee (Kay and Zimmer 1978,
Partee 1984, Bach 1994). The presence of a free variable X is a semantic
constraint (imposed by the perfect form), but the value of X has to be filled
in via pragmatic inferences. Possible values of X for sentences (4) and (5)
and the traditional labels for the corresponding uses of the perfect are shown
informally in (4a)-(4b) and (5a)-(5b), respectively.'
(4)

( 5)

Ken has broken his leg.
a. His leg is currently broken.
-Entailed resultative reading
(X(s)=Ken'sJeg_be_broken(s))
b. Ken is behind in his project.
-Conversationally implicated resultative reading (Depraetere 1998)
(X ( s)=Ken_be_behind_in_his_project( s))
c. #Susan is married to Mike.
(X(s) =Susan_be_married_to..Mike (s).)
Ken has lived in London.
a. Ken (still) lives in London.
-Continuative reading
(X ( s)= KenJive_in_London( s))
b. Ken knows good restaurants in London.
-Conversationally implicated resultative reading
(X ( s)=Ken_know _good_restaurants_in_London( s))

Nishiyama and Koenig argue that the pragmatic process through which
the value of X is determined is, broadly speaking, neo-Gricean in nature,
and can be modeled using the Minimization and Maximization principles of
(Levinson 2000). The fact that the inference process addressees must engage
in is governed by these principles, properly exclude as values of X temporally
coincidental but otherwise unrelated states such as (4c ). In normal contexts,
addressees cannot infer that Susan is married to Mike from the fact that Ken
1

We call entailed resultative perfect reading readings in which the value of X corresponds to the resultant state entailed by the base eventuality description. We call
conversationally implicated resultative perfect reading or (non-entailed) resultative
perfect reading the reading that results when the value of X is a resultant state that
is not entailed from the base eventuality description.
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broke his leg. Despite its success in accounting for all uses of the English
present perfect without resorting to ambiguity, Nishiyama and Koenig's proposal, like Portner's and Borillo's, does not provide any details on the rules
addressees might use to derive the value of X; nor does it provide corpus evidence of the plausibility of the inferential process that it claims hearers or
readers of sentences containing a perfect must engage in. The next section
presents the results of a corpus study that provides such evidence.

3 A Corpus Study
We collected data from various genres, two newspapers of the same date (July
1st 1996), the first two discussion articles of the same month of the year (July
1996) in CQ Researcher Online (http://library2.cqpress.com/cqresearcher),
conversation data from the Switchboard Corpus (Graff et al. 1998, files
sw2001.txt through sw2019.txt), and narrative data from Netlibrary
(http://www.netlibrary.com/) (two novels, one biography). We examined the
interpretation of all present perfect examples including those that occurred in
embedded clauses in the corpora. Non-finite forms of the perfect, e.g., the
perfect following modal auxiliaries or to were excluded from analysis, as well
as the idiomatic expression 've got to.
We first classified all examples in accordance with the traditional labels
for perfect uses. 81.82 percent of all examples were either entailed resultative
perfects or continuative perfects (Type (i) below) 2 ; most of the other examples
were existential or non-entailed resultative perfects (18.02 percent) (mostly
Type (ii) and (iii) below). Table 1 shows the percentages of entailed resultative,
continuative, existential, and non-entailed resultative perfect readings in each
corpus.
2

The percentage includes the examples which can be categorized either as entailed
resultative or continuative perfect uses in Table 1.
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Table 1: Numbers and Percentages of entailed, continuative, existential, and
resultative perfect examples in corpora 1
Entailed

Continuative

Existential

A

B

c
D
E
Total

24
64
86
32
46
252
(41.65%)

Non-entailed

Others

Total

2
0
2
0
I
5:l
(0.83%)

61
151
155
100
138
605
(100%)

resultative

resultative

22
68
52
38
59
239
(39.50%)

0
6
8
10
9
33
(5.46%)

13
13
7
20
23
76
(12.56%)

1

See Michaelis ( 1998) for definitions of the uses of the perfect mentioned in the
table.
2
Four of these five examples can be interpreted either as entailed resultative or
continuative perfect readings, while one can be interpreted either as a continuative
or resultative perfect.
A Newspaperl:Reuters Financial News, 07.01.1996.
8
Newspaper 2: Wall Street Journal, 07.01.1996.
c Discussion:CQ Researcher, 07.1996.
Conversation:Switchboard Corpus (SW2001-SW2019)
E Narrative: H. G. Wells, The Time Machine; I. Bernard Cohen, Howard Aiken: Portrait of a Computer Pioneer; Willa Cather, Of Pioneer!

°

4 Default Inference Patterns
We then determined for each type of perfect use which inference rules addressees must have used, were they to successfully determine the category of
the perfect state which the perfect introduces in discourse according to Kamp
and Reyle and others (the value of X in Nishiyama and Koenig (2004)). We
isolated three major classes of inference patterns.
Type (i) Entailed or continuative perfects: For this most frequent class of
examples, readers need draw only trivial inferences in order to find the value
of X. The state either described or entailed by the base eventuality description
persists until the present. To derive X, readers need only apply the presumption of persistence default rule (McDermott 1982). ( 6) and (7) are examples
of continuative perfect readings, while (8) and (9) illustrate entailed resultative
perfect readings.
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... ,he has been a member of her household ever since. (X=He is a
member of her household.) (Cather 1996, p.24)
Since the war ended, the U.S. has kept 5,000 troops in Saudi-provided
housing, .... (X =The U.S. keeps 5,000 troops in Saudi-provided housing.) (Graff 1995-1997, Wall Street Journa/.07.01.1996)
Yeltsin's health has become a major issue in the closing days of Russia's presidential race. (X =Yeltsin's health is a major issue in the closing days of Russia's presidential race.) (Graff 1995-1997, Wall Street
Journal. 0 7. 01.1996)
A few tribes have managed to establish a foothold in their local economies
without the benefit of gaming revenues. (X =A few tribes have a
foothold in their local economies without the benefit of gaming revenues.) (Cooper 1996, July 12)

Type (ii) Speech Act/Epistemic perfects. Some perfect sentences have speech
act verbs or epistemic verbs as their main verbs and the value of X can be inferred via default rules that reflect the speaker and hearer's expectations about
each other's speech acts. They can be divided into two subtypes.
Subtype (ii-a) Evidential uses. Speakers and authors may use a perfect to
communicate that the complement of performative or epistemic verbs such as
say, promise, or see presently holds or is likely to hold in the future, as seen in
(10) and (11).
Sumitomo has said its losses from Mr. Hamanaka's trading stand at
$1.8 billion. (X=Sumitomo's losses from Mr. Hamanaka's trading
stand at $1.8 billion.) (Graff1995-1997, Wall Street Journa/.07.01.1996)
( 11) Britain's opposition Labor Party has also promised a ban on all tobacco advertising if it wins the election due to be held by May next
year. (X =There is likely to be a ban on all tobacco advertising if the
Labor Party wins the election.) (Graff 1995-1997, Reuters Financial
News, 07.01.1996.)
(10)

To infer the value of X, readers of (10) rely on the default rule that
if somebody says something, it is (typically) true. Similarly, to infer the
value of X, readers of ( 11) rely on the default rule that if somebody promises
something, it is likely to become true. Both rules are based on the sincerity
conditions associated with the speech acts of saying and promising, respectively (Searle 1969, Searle and Vanderveken 1985) and reflect our expectations
that speakers are sincere when they speak. They can be described as follows
(>means 'nonmonotonically/defeasibly entail' Pelletier and Asher (1997)).
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(12) \:lx\:lp(say(x,p)>true(p))
(13) \:lx\:lp(promise(x, p)> likely(Future(p)))
Relying on such rules, readers can easily infer that what Sumitomo says
is true in (1 0) or that what the Labor Party promised is likely to become true
if they win in (11).
Subtype (ii-b) Topic negotiation. Speakers sometimes use a perfect at the
beginning of a conversation to set up a topic. (14)-(15) are examples of such
uses from the Switchboard corpus.
(14)
(15)

Have you done a lot of camping recently? (X=I want to talk about
camping.) (Graff eta!. 1998, sw2009.txt)
A: Have you seen DANCING WITH WOLVES? (X=I want to talk
about the movies.)
B: Yeah. I've seen that, that's, uh, that was a really good movie. (Graff
eta!. 1998, sw2010.txt)

The speaker in these examples uses the present perfect to negotiate a topic
she wants to talk about. She does so by asking the addressee whether an epistemic pre-condition for having a conversation on her chosen topic is satisfied,
by asking, e.g., the extent of the addressee's experience or knowledge of the
topic. In such uses, the speaker counts on the addressee making use of the
default rule that if she wants to know whether he knows something (and thus
can talk about it), she probably wants to talk about it.
(16)

\:lx\:ly( ask..addressee_know (x, y) > wanualk (x, y))

In (15) the addressee (B) accepts the topic by saying that he has had the
experience of watching the movie and therefore knows and can talk about it.
Importantly, the perfect is used in examples (14) and (15) at the start of a new
conversation between two strangers where it makes little sense to presume the
existence of a presupposed or shared topic between the speech participants.
Such examples are therefore difficult to explain for Portner (2003) and Borillo
eta!. (2004) who claim that the use of a perfect form presumes the existence
of a shared topic in the context.
Of course one might argue that the perfect putative presupposition that
there is a mutually agreed topic for the current conversation may be accommodated in examples such as ( 14) and (15). We find this possibility quite unlikely.
Accommodation is a repair strategy by which addressees can make sense out
of the speaker's utterance, despite its pragmatic infelicity (Lewis 1979). For
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example, if an addressee does not know that the speaker has a daughter and
hears that the speaker's daughter is getting married, then he might be willing
to accommodate the failed presupposition and simply assume post facto that
the speaker has a daughter. But consider the conversational turns that follow
example (15).
(17)

B: Probably one of the best things about it was the scenery and, uh, I
thought the story was pretty good, too. I, I think Kevin Costner did a
really good job with it.
A: Have you ever lived in that part of the country? (X =I want to talk
about that part of the country.)
B: No. I haven't.
A: Have you ever visited it? (X =I want to talk about that part of the
country.)
B: Urn, I've visited the Wyoming area. I'm not sure exactly where
DANCES WITH WOLVES was filmed.
A: I think it was the black hills of South Dakota.
B: Could be. I, n-, I haven't been to South Dakota. Have, have you
been up to that? (X=I want to talk about South Dakota.)
A: Well, I lived in Omaha for five,
B: Oh. (Graffet al. 1998, sw2010.txt)

In (17) participant A uses the perfect several other times to shift topic. By
uttering Have you ever visited it? or Have you ever lived in that part of the
country?, the speaker suggests that she now wishes to discuss the region in
which Dances with wolves was filmed. The repeated use of the perfect to
introduce or shift topic makes it unlikely that B accommodates a presupposed
existing topic: The notion of topic shift is inconsistent with accommodating a
presupposition that there exists a mutually agreed upon topic.
Furthermore, these examples and several similar ones we found were
taken from a telephone conversation between two people who do not know
each other and who could chat about whatever they wanted although a topic
was suggested by the research team that culled the Switchboard Corpus. The
fact that there is less mutual ground among strangers, the fact that no shared
situational information could provide a topic makes it also particularly unlikely for the speaker to expect the hearer to be willing to accommodate the
presupposition that there was an already agreed upon topic. Resorting to accommodation to explain away examples (14)-(17) would render the notion of
presupposition vacuous in that it is hard to imagine what unsatisfied presupposition would not be able to be accommodated, if those in examples ( 14)-(17)
are.
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Finally, examples such as (14) and (15) are particularly problematic for
Portner (2003) who takes the view that topics are implicit questions to which
sentences whose main verb is in the perfect form provide an answer, since
these perfects occur in interrogative clauses.
Type (iii) Common sense entailment Authors sometimes use the perfect to
indicate that the occurrence of an event provides evidence or an explanation
for the truth of a claim she made or will make. The value of X in these cases
is the state description conveyed by a clause that preceded or followed the
sentence containing the perfect. For example, in (18) the event introduced by
the perfect sentence (that the U.S. Air Force flew an average of 1,500 missions
a month) supports and provides evidence for the assertion conveyed by the first
sentence. The fact that the U.S. forces flew so many missions serves as proof
that they were busy.

(18)

Iraq still keeps U.S. forces busy, too (=X). U.S. Air Force fighter
jets have flown an average of I ,500 missions a month over southern
Iraq since 1992, in an effort to make sure Iraq doesn't violate a nofly zone or attack its Shiite population. (Graff 1995-1997, Wall Street
Journal. 0 7. 0 1.1996)

In order to find the value of X in example (18), readers need to make use
of a rather specific common sense entailment rule such as (19).
(19)

Vx'Vy(fly_1,500_missions_a_month_over (y, x) > keep_busy (x, y))

(20) is a similar example.
(20)

House Democratic leader Richard Gephardt of Missouri, who has been
less enthusiastic about budget cutting than Mr. Clinton, has played
a key role in recruiting the party's congressional candidates. Many
are merely reflecting his priorities, as opposed to those of the White
House.(=X(s)) (Graff 1995-1997, Wall Street Journa/.07.01.1996)

Here, Gephardt's key role in recruiting candidates explains that many congressional candidates reflect his priorities. Readers infer the value of X, using
another rather specific common sense entailment rule, the one stated in (21 ).
(21)

Vx'Vy(play.Jce)JJ"Ole.recruiting(x, y)

> reflect.priorities_of(y, x))

It is striking that the value of X for the overwhelming majority of present
perfect examples we have looked at so far can be found through very general
default principles. 81.82 percent of all the examples belong to Type (i), where
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the value of X can be derived through the principle of persistence. 11.24 percent of the examples belong to Type (ii), where the value of X can be inferred
through general default expectations regarding speech acts. In total, 93.06 percent of the examples of perfect we looked at require general default rules to
assign a value to X. Only a small number of examples (4.63 percent), such
as (18) and (20), requires specific commonsense knowledge rules. Table 2
summarizes the types of rules used to determine the value of X in our sample.

type

(i)

Table 2: Perfects of Type (i)-(iii)
(iii)
(ii) Speech Act/Epistemic

Persistence

180

A,B

(ii-a)

(ii-b)

Evidential Use

Topic negotiation

21

0

Ex:l. R:20

c

140

9

a

Ex:4,R:5

5

0

Ex:O,R:5

70

D

7

13

Ex:2,R:5

105

E

I

Toml

I

495
(81.82%)

I

18

4
Ex:2, R:3

51
(8.43%)

I

17
(2.81%)

6

4
Ex:3

8
5
Ex:2, R:3

I

2
Ex:l,R:I

Ex:4, R:2

Ex:3,R:5

Ex:O, R:l3

Ex:2, R:l6

Others

Common sense

28
(4.63%)

2
Ex:2

6
Ex:4, R:2

I (2.31
14
%)

A,B Newspaper
c Discussion:CQ researcher
Conversation:Switchboard
E Narrative
a 'Ex: I' and 'R:20' are the numbers of existential and resultative perfect
readings

°

Three differences distinguish Type (i-ii) and Type (iii). First, the entailment rules used in Type (iii), such as those in (19) or (21), are much more
specific than the kinds of rules used in Type (i) and Type (ii). Second, the
value of X can be found in the surrounding text, either before or after the
sentence containing the perfect in Type (iii), as shown in (18) and (20). In
(18) the first sentence's state description corresponds to the value of X for the
second sentence, which contains the perfect. In (20) the value of X for the
perfect in the first sentence is provided by the state description found in the
second sentence. Third, the perfect in Type (iii) is instrumental in establishing the coherence of the discourse in which the sentence containing it occurs.
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More precisely, the commonsense entailment rule used to find the value of X
in Type (iii) is a crucial premise needed to establish the discourse relation between the sentence that contains the perfect and the sentence that contains the
state description that is the value of X.
We illustrate this dual function of the commonsense entailment rule on
sentence (18), following the approach to discourse coherence developed in
SDRT (Asher and Lascarides 2003). In SDRT, for two sentences or other
pieces of text to form a coherent discourse segment, there must be a discourse
relation R that relates their corresponding meaning representations or DRSs.
More precisely, R takes two utterances' meaning representations as its arguments (R(n" 1r 2 ) where 1ri is a label for the DRS of an utterance or clause)
and is nonmonotonically inferred from the information content of utterances,
discourse contexts, and world knowledge. Our claim is that the use of the perfect have .flown in sentence (18) facilitates the establishment of the coherence
relation R. This is because the perfect triggers a search for the value of X and
the retrieval of the commonsense rule in (19). The use of this rule, in turn,
helps establish an evidence coherence relation between the sentence in which
the perfect occurs and the sentence that includes the state description that is
the value of X, because of the discourse coherence rule in (22).
(22)

Evidence Rule
'</a'</(3'</P'</P''</e'</e'((P(e,a)
dence (a, (3))

1\

P'(e',(J)

1\

(P(e) > P'(e')))---> Evi-

(22) says that if the eventuality descriptions P and P' are true of e and
e' in DRSs a and (3 and one can defeasibly infer P'(e') from P(e), then a
is evidence for (3. In other words, if one makes two claims such that one
can (defeasibly) infer the truth of the first from that of the second, the second
claim is evidence in favor of the first claim. By evoking a rule on the basis of
which one can defeasibly derive P'(e') from P(e), the perfect in (18) helps
trigger the rule in (22) on which the coherence of the discourse in (18) partly
rests. The simplified segmented discourse representation structure (SDRS)
for (18) is shown in Figure 2. (1r 1 and 7r 2 are labels for the simplified DRSs
corresponding to the first and second sentences of (18), respectively).

5 Conclusion
Since Reichenbach (194 7), studies of the perfect have recognized the role of
the English perfect in discourses. But few studies have looked at a large data
set of perfect examples. This paper has tried to assess anew the role the En-
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7r1,7T2

s, n
1r 1

:

1

lraq_stil/Jreep_US..forces_busy(s)

T(s) on

ev,s,n
Air _Force_fly_l, 500_missions_over _/raq(ev)
T(ev) -< n
1f2:

X(s)
T(s) on
X =lraq_sti/l_keep_US..forces_busy
Evidence(rr 1. 1r 2)

Figure 2: SDRS for (18)

glish perfect plays in discourse by examining the kinds of interpretations 605
present perfect examples receive and the inferences readers and hearers need
to make to arrive at these interpretations. Several preliminary conclusions result from this examination. First, theories of the perfect that hypothesize that
it presupposes or elaborates a topic do not seem to account for all uses of the
perfect, in particular its use in conversation to establish or shift topic. Second,
the overwhelming majority of present perfects are continuative or entailed resultative perfects whose understanding only requires trivial inferences on the
part of hearers. Third, the remaining examples fall into a few inference patterns that either use general default rules or easily accessible commonsense
rules. The overall picture that emerges from our corpus study is that determining the nature of the perfect state posited by theories that treat the perfect as
a stativizer is a feasible task. Of course, determining the nature of the perfect
state is not the end of the story. Present perfects serve further "perlocutionary" functions in texts and conversations. Although we cannot go into these
further discourse functions in this paper, let us suggest that each of the types
of perfect we isolated seems to serve a distinct one. The perfect use in Type
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(i) and (iia) serve to introduce the value of X in discourse, although Type (iia)
further qualify this introduction, by mentioning the source of the information
regarding this state. The perfect use in Type (iib) is used to negotiate topics.
Finally, the perfect use in Type (iii) serves to establish discourse coherence.
We summarize these various uses and other differences among the different
kinds of inferences addressees must perform when interpreting present perfects in Table 3.
Table 3: Inference types and discourse functions
Type (i)

Type (ii)

Type (iii)

(a) Evidential

(b) Topic Nego

Commonsense

General inference

+

+

+

-

Value X ina

-

-

-

+

surrounding text

Discourse

Introduce

Introduce

Topic

Help establish

function

implicitly X(s)

with qualification

negotiation

discourse

~the perf_"ct ....

in discourse

X {s) in discourse

-

'·

relation
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